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NOTE
RELIGIOUS HYBRIDS IN THE LOWER COURTS:
FREE EXERCISE PLUS OR CONSTITUTIONAL
SMOKE SCREEN?
After the recent restriction of the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA)1 in City of Boerne v. F/ores,2 the Supreme Court's seminal
free exercise decision in Employment Division v. Smith3 has received re-
newed strength (at least as applied to the states). 4 Smith rejected the
thirty-year-old application of strict scrutiny to free exercise cases which
had been mandated by Sherbert v. Verner5 in 1963. In its place, a new
test upholding any law which was "neutral and generally applicable"
was adopted.6 "By holding an individual's religious beliefs do not 'ex-
cuse him from compliance with an otherwise valid law,' the Court re-
verted to the harsh dictates of the Reynolds regimen, mitigated only by
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994).
2 117 S. Ct. 2157 (1997).
3 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
4 The Boerne decision held that RFRA was unconstitutional as applied to the
states (as a matter of federalism) but did not clearly rule as to RFRA's constitutionality
as applied to federal law. Thus, several courts have held that as a federal matter, RFRA
remains the law of the land. See In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998); In re
Hodge, 220 B.R. 386 (D. Idaho 1998). For commentary arguing the same position,
see John W. Whitehead, Religious Freedom in the Nineties: Betwixt and Between Flores and
Smith, 37 WASHBURN LJ. 105, 111 (1997). But see Waguespack v. Rodriguez, 220 B.R.
31 (W.D. La. 1998) (refusing to apply RFRA after Boerne).
To the extent that RFRA is still viable, hybrid claims are essentially meaningless
for claims involving federal action. "[A]s long as RFRA remains the law of the land,
the hybrid passage will be little more than a' constitutional appendix, present within
the corpusjuris, but practically useless." James R. Mason, III, Comment, Smith's Free-
Exercise "Hybrids" Rooted in Non-Free-Exercise Soi 6 REGENT U. L. Rxv. 201, 204 (1995).
5 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
6 See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993) (citing to Smith for the proposition "that a law that is neutral and of general
applicability need not be justified by a compelling governmental interest").
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Justice Scalia's invention of the 'hybrid exception.' ,,7 Met with almost
universal disfavor by both academics and judges,8 Smith was viewed as
a decision doomed to quick reversal. But some eight years later, the
Court continues to uphold the application of Smith and it now re-
quires renewed attention.
This Note looks at how lower courts have interpreted and applied
the hybrid rights exception. I have separated the lower court cases
based upon the type of hybrid claims that they involve. Part I estab-
lishes the analytical framework in which hybrids exist. Part II deals
with hybrid claims involving the freedom of speech. Part III deals with
parents' rights to educate their children. Part IV analyzes the free-
dom of association. Part V addresses the various other types of hy-
brids which have been attempted in court as well as those suggested by
the academy. Finally, Part VI concludes with a brief overview of the
future of the hybrid exception in free exercise jurisprudence.
I. HYBRID RIGHTS FRAMEWORK
A. History of the Hybrid
In what may have been no more than dicta,9 the Smith Court at-
tempted to conform all previous free exercise precedent to the neu-
tral, generally applicable law standard-in other words, attempting to
say, "We have really applied this standard all along." For the most
part, this was not a terribly difficult prospect since the Court had
never really applied the Sherbert strict scrutiny test with consistency. 10
7 Roald Mykkeltvedt, Employment Division v. Smith: Creating Anxiety by Relieving
Tension, 58 TENN. L. REV. 603, 623 (1991) (footnote omitted) (referring to the scru-
tiny test of Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878)).
8 See Mark Tushnet, The Rhetoric of Free Exercise Discourse, 1993 BYU L. REV. 117,
117 ("The Supreme Court's decision in Employment Division v. Smith outraged most
scholars of the Free Exercise Clause."); see also James E. Ryan, Note, Smith and the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An Iconoclastic Assessment, 78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1409
n.15 (1992) (collecting the scholarly criticisms of Smith).
9 See Michael S. Satow, Conscientious Objectors: Their Status, The Law and its Develop-
ment, 3 GEO. MASON U. Civ. RTS. L.J. 113, 133 (1992) ([The hybrid exception] "does
not appear to be a commandment by the Supreme Court. Indeed it is merely a state-
ment of fact.").
10 See Michael W. McConnell, Free Exercise Revisionism and the Smith Decision, 57 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1109 (1990):
[I] t must be conceded that the Supreme Court before Smith did not really
apply a genuine 'compelling interest' test. Such a test would allow the gov-
ernment to override a religious objection only in the most extraordinary of
circumstances. In an area of law where a genuine 'compelling interest' test
has been applied, [racial discrimination] .... no such interest has been dis-
covered in almost half a century.
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In the twenty-seven years following Sherbert, the Court was faced with a
total of seventeen free exercise cases. In these,' the religious objector
lost in thirteen while three of the remaining four dealt with unem-
ployment compensation claims." This left Wisconsin v. Yoder12 as the
only nonemployment case which could not be squared with the new
approach. Rather than overturning Yoder, Justice Scalia (writing for
the majority) carved out the following exception to accommodate
those few future cases which could not possibly fit the Court's new
model:13
The only decisions in which we have held that the First Amendment
bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law to religiously
motivated action have involved not the Free Exercise Clause alone,
but the Free Exercise Clause in conjunction with other constitu-
tional protections, such as freedom of speech and of the press ....
or the right of parents . . . to direct the education of their chil-
dren.... Some of our cases prohibiting compelled expression, de-
cided exclusively upon free speech grounds, have also involved
freedom of religion .... And it is easy to envision a case in which a
challenge on freedom of association grounds would likewise be re-
inforced by Free Exercise Clause concerns. 14
B. Form of the Hybrid
This "convenient discovery"' 5 of the "hybrid"16 exception is
aimed at the level of scrutiny to be applied by the court in examining
the constitutionality of a law burdening religious activity.' 7 Under the
Id at 1127
11 See Ryan, supra note 8, at 1458. The unemployment cases do not affect the
focus of this Note since Smith retained strict scrutiny in unemployment situations
which involve "a system of individual exemptions." Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. The hybrid
exception only comes into play when a generally applicable law is involved.
12 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
13 The hybrid exception can thus be characterized "as an unartful tool to distin-
guish troubling precedent." Joanne C. Brant, Taking the Supreme Court at Its Word: The
Implications for RFRA and Separation of Powers, 56 MONT. L. REv. 5, 30 (1995); see also
Thomas C. Berg, The Constitutional Future of Religious Freedom Legislation, 20 U. Aiu.
LrrrLE RocK LJ. 715, 751 (1998).
14 Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990) (cases and citations omitted).
15 James M. Donovan, Restoring Free Exercise Protections By Limiting Them: Preventing
a Repeat of Smith, 17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 1, 49 n.18 (1996).
16 This phrase is derived from Scalia's statement in Smith that the facts of that
case did not present "such a hybrid situation." Smith, 494 U.S. at 882.
17 The Smith decision only affects analysis in Free Exercise cases dealing with reli-
gious action. Smith specifically retained Sherbert strict scrutiny analysis for cases involv-
ing a state imposed burden on religious belief "Thus, the First Amendment obviously
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Sherbert test, the government was required to show a compelling inter-
est to uphold any law which placed a substantial burden on religion.
Smith eliminated this test for neutral, generally applicable laws but at
least implicitly retained a higher standard of analysis for the hybrid
exception.18 However, it is not clear from Smith itself what this
"higher" level of analysis is. Most courts and commentators have as-
sumed that the appropriate standard is the Sherbert strict scrutiny
test.19 Even some courts that have refused to analyze the hybrid rights
claim did so because this "is simply to require us to apply the same test
we must apply in any event under [RFRA] "; in other words, strict scru-
tiny.20 I agree with this view and assume for purposes of this Note that
strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard for hybrid analysis.
excludes all 'governmental regulation of religious beliefs as such.'" Smith, 494 U.S. at
877 (quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963)).
18 SeeVandiver v. Hardin County Bd. of Educ., 925 F.2d 927, 933 (6th Cir. 1991)
("The Smith decision implies without stating that those hybrid claims which raise a
free exercise challenge coupled with other constitutional concerns remain subject to
strict scrutiny."); Chalifoux v. New Caney Indep. Sch. Dist., 976 F. Supp. 659, 671
(S.D. Tex. 1997) (noting the "heightened level of scrutiny used in hybrid cases"); First
United Methodist Church v. Hearing Examiner, 916 P.2d 374, 379 (Wash. 1996).
19 See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers v. St. Theresa, 696 A.2d 709, 722 (N.J. 1997);
Hill-Murray Fed'n of Teachers v. Hill-Murray High Sch., 487 N.W.2d 857, 862 (Minn.
1992); State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990) (noting that compelling
interest is the correct standard for hybrid claims). For general commentary, see Ber-
trand Fry, Note, Breeding Constitutional Doctrine: The Provenance and Progeny of the "Hy-
brid Situation" in Current Free Exercise Jurisprudence, 71 TEX. L. REV. 833, 838-41 (1993).
See also Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 BYU L. REV. 275, 308 ("Hybrid cases continue
to enjoy strict scrutiny review by the courts. . . ."); ThomasJ. Cunningham, Consider-
ing Religion As a Factor in Foster Care in the Aftermath of Employment Division, Depart-
ment of Human Resources v. Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 28 U.
RICH. L. REv. 53, 65 (1994) ("[Wlhen faced with such a 'hybrid' challenge, courts
should continue to apply the 'compelling interest' test."); Rod M. Fliegel, Free Exercise
Fidelity and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993: Where We Are, Where We Have
Been, and Where We Are Going, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 39, 69 (1994) ("Under the
hybrid claim exception, claims involving free exercise rights [and other rights] ...
trigger strict scrutiny .... ."); and David M. Smolin, The Free Exercise Clause, The Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, and the Right to Active and Passive Euthanasia, 10 ISSuES L. &
MED. 3, 25 (1994) (noting the same).
20 Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 921 (Cal. 1996).
See also Jennifer L. Rosato, Putting Square Pegs in a Round Hole: Procedural Due Process
and the Effect of Faith Healing Exemptions on the Prosecution of Faith Healing Parents, 29
U.S.F. L. REy. 43, 79 (1994) ("Even if the parents' claim is a hybrid one, the result
under the First Amendment probably would be the same as the result under RFRA:
the strict scrutiny standard would apply .... .").
[VOL. 74:1
RELIGIOUS HYBRIDS IN THE LOWER COURTS
I also assume that hybrid claims are subject to the same rules of
standing,2 1 ripeness, 22 initial burden of proof,23 and other procedural
requirements as are other constitutional claims. 24 As an initial matter,
the plaintiff must still prove that a particular state action has caused a
burden to a sincerely held religious conviction and at least one other
constitutional right.2 5 For purposes of hybrid claims, it is not clear
whether this proof need be substantial but it must at least be sufficient
to implicate the right.
26
21 See Vandiver, 925 F.2d at 933 (noting that parents' hybrid claims were barred by
a lack of standing and the statute of limitations); see also Health Servs. v. Temple
Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130, 136 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that religious day
care did not have standing to raise parental right to educate).
22 See Hinrichs v. Whitburn, 772 F. Supp. 423, 431-32 (W.D. Wis. 1991) (dis-
missing free exercise claim as unripe and therefore not having anything to combine
with a parental right to educate in order to form a hybrid).
23 See South Jersey Catholic Sch. Teachers, 696 A.2d at 721 (dismissing associational
hybrid for defendant's failure to present "any argument in their briefs to support that
claim"). At the very least, both a free exercise and "other" type claim must be raised.
See Fowler v. Robinson, No. 94-CV-836, 1996 WL 67994, at *14 (N.D.N.Y. Feb. 15,
1996) (noting that no hybrid claim exists if plaintiff fails to allege another constitu-
tional right); see also Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280
(Alaska 1994) (noting the same).
24 See Swanson v. Guthrie, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir, 1998) ("[S]imply raising
[a hybrid claim] is not a talisman that automatically leads to application of the com-
pelling-interest test. We must examine the claimed infringements on the party's
claimed rights to determine whether either the claimed rights or the claimed in-
fringements are genuine."). But seeAnn L. Wehener, Comment, When a House is Not a
Home But a Church: A Proposal for Protection of Home Worship from Zoning Ordinances, 22
CAP. U. L. REv. 491, 510-11 (1993) (arguing that a burden on religion may only have
to be proved when the "other" right of the hybrid is an unenumerated right such as
the right to educate children; cases involving enumerated rights such as free speech
would not require proof of a burden).
25 See Christ College v. Board of Supervisors, Fairfax County, No. 90-2406, 1991
WL 179102, at *4 (4th Cir. Apr. 8, 1991) (dismissing hybrid claim for failure "to estab-
lish the first element in any free exercise claim; [plaintiffs] have not proved that the
[challenged laws] burden their exercise of religion"); see alsoJohn A. Russ IV, Shall We
Dance? Gay Equality and Religious Exemptions at Private California High School Proms, 42
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 71, 115 (1998) (noting elements of a hybrid claim). Hybrid claims
also involve questions of fact, and are thus not subject to resolution on a motion to
dimiss. See United States v. Hsia, No. Crim. 98-0057(PLF), 1998 WL 635848, at
*10-11 (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 1998).
26 See A-Amin v. City of New York, 979 F. Supp. 168, 171 n.4 (E.D.N.Y. 1997)
(refusing to apply hybrid analysis since "plaintiffs' vending activity does not implicate
freedom of speech"); see also RonaldJ. Colombo, Note, Forgive Us Our Sins: The Inade-
quacies of the Clergq-Penitent Privilege 73 N.Y.U. L. Rxv. 225, 252 n.61 ("Smith's reference
to other freedoms must involve something more than mere implication, referring to
those situations where other freedoms are directly abridged."). But see State v. Hersh-
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Finally, I assume that the Smith test applies to civil laws as well as
to criminal statutes. Most courts have now addressed this issue and
almost all have held that the Smith holding extends beyond its exist-
ence as a criminal case. 27 The only striking exception to this is the
Ninth Circuit, which has consistently limited Smith to the criminal
context.28 While neither Lukumi (which dealt with a criminal ordi-
nance) nor Boerne resolved this issue, the reasoning of the majority
seems more in line with the reasoning of Smith itself.
C. Substance of the Hybrid
"Assessing the relevance of the 'combination' or 'hybrid' analysis
in Smith is hard. Most scholars assume this language was a make-
weight to 'explain' Yoder that lacks enduring significance." 29 Some
even question whether it remains a part of free exercise law at all.30
No one seems to understand what constitutes such a claim31 or where
its boundaries should be drawn.3 2 Perhaps the most biting criticism of
berger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990) (noting that a free exercise claim need
only "touch" on another constitutional right).
27 For a listing of cases addressing this issue, see Jeremy Meyer, Ratchet Plus? Possi-
ble Constitutional Foundations for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 48 WASH. U.
J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343, 351 n.51 (1995).
28 See American Friends v. Thornburgh, 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991); NLRB v.
Hanna Boys Ctr., 940 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1991). This distinction continues to exist
and was most recently applied in Washington v. Garcia, 977 F. Supp. 1067 (S.D. Cal.
1997).
29 Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of "Tests" Under the Religion
Clauses, 1995 Sup. CT. REV. 323, 335.
30 See Eugene Gressman & Angela C. Carmella, The RFRA Revision of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, 57 OHIO ST. L.J. 65, 90 (1996) ("[The hybrid analysis] balancing is not part
of the doctrine of the Free Exercise Clause; it is doctrine for the new hybridized
grouping of constitutional provisions, of which free exercise is only a part and the
contours of which we cannot yet see."). But most courts have continued to treat it as
part of free exercise law. SeeJane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537, 1547 (D. Utah
1992) (dismissing Free Exercise claim only after holding that the law is neutral, gener-
ally applicable and there is no hybrid right).
31 See, e.g., Russell S. Bonds, Comment, First Covenant Church V. City of Seattle:
The Washington Supreme Court Fortifies the Free Exercise Rights of Religious Landmarks
Against Historic Preservation Restrictions, 27 GA. L. REV. 589, 614 (1993) ("Any potential
overextension of the hybrid exception ... results from the lack of clarity in the Smith
decision.").
32 See Swanson v. Guthrie, 135 F.3d 694, 699 (10th Cir. 1998) ("It is difficult to
delineate the exact contours of the hybrid-rights theory discussed in Smith."). Yet,
even in light of this, the hybrid right was seen as enough of a "clearly established
constitutional right" to defeat a city employee's motion for summaryjudgment on the
issue of qualified immunity! See Rourke v. New York State Dep't of Correctional Serv.,
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the new hybrid analysis was written by Justice Souter in Church of the
Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah:33
[T]he distinction Smith draws strikes me as ultimately untenable. If
a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is
implicated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as
to swallow the Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would
cover the situation exemplified by Smith.... But if a hybrid claim is
one in which the litigant would actually obtain an exemption from a
formally neutral, generally applicable law under another constitutional
provision, then there would have been no reason for the Court in
what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have mentioned the Free Exer-
cise Clause at all.3 4
The distinction which Justice Souter makes is critical. Does the
religious victor gain an exemption from the law based upon the
"other" constitutional provision, which is compelling enough to win
on its own, or is the exemption granted to a combination of losing
rights, which together become worthy of constitutional protection?35
Is the hybrid exception a mere front for deciding free exercise cases
upon other constitutionally protected grounds (most notably free
speech)3 6 or does it have some separate value of its own? Lower
courts were left to interpret the hybrid claim in one of these two ways.
915 F. Supp. 525, 541 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (involving the firing of a Native American
correctional officer for refusing to cut his long hair).
33 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
34 Id. at 567 (Souter, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
35 See Rodney A. Smolla, The Free Exercise of Religion After the Fall: The Case for Inter-
mediate Scrutiny, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 925, 930 (1998).
Is there some sort of constitutional chemistry at work, some sort of synergy
created by the combination of ingredients, so that the free exercise claim,
when joined with a privacy or free speech claim somehow activates an other-
wise inert clause? Or was the Court in Smith saying something even sim-
pler-that the Free Exercise Clause has no appreciable power of its own, at
least in the absence of laws that especially target religion for discriminatory
treatment?
Id.
36 See William P. Marshall, Solving the Free Exercise Dilemma: Free Exercise as Expres-
sion, 67 MINN. L. REv. 545 (1983); see also R. Collin Mangrum, The Falling Star of Free
Exercise: Free Exercise and Substantive Due Process Entitlement Claims in City of Boeme v.
Flores, 31 CREIGHTON L. Rv. 693, 728 (1998) ("[Some] see these cases as pure free
speech cases, unaffected by their free exercise context, prompting a 'reductionist'
argument that the Free Speech Clause reaches all that is constitutionally protectable
under free exercise.").
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1. The Logical Interpretation
If hybrid analysis means whatJustice Scalia logically implies that it
does, there should be something of an equal correlation between the
success of any type of hybrids, particularly those formed with free
speech or the parental right to educate. 37 You begin with two sepa-
rate claims (free exercise and another constitutional provision) and
discover that these both lose by themselves. Then, you combine the
two and create an entirely new constitutional animal which is subject
to strict scrutiny (without any reference to the standard of analysis for
the underlying claims).3s If hybrid analysis were applied literally, this
new beast would not be laden down with any debris from the rejection
of the two prior individual claims but would have a life of its own.39 It
would not simply be equal to the sum of its component parts.
To put this into formulaic terms, assume that a "live" constitu-
tional claim has the value of two and a "dead" claim (i.e., one which is
not sufficient to win on its own) has a value of zero. Before any judi-
cial ruling, we would have a free exercise claim = 2 and another consti-
tutional claim = 2. The court rejects both after conducting separate
individual analyses. Now we have free exercise = 0 and "other" = 0.
Yet, if applied literally, the court should now combine the two sepa-
37 This requires the logical assumption that the success of the hybrid claim is
independent of the success or failure of its constituent parts or their relative strength
or weakness as constitutional claims. The consequence of this assumption is to give
the same degree of protection to unenumerated rights as to enumerated rights.
Moreover, it even makes unenumerated rights "superior" as compared with free exer-
cise alone. See Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 37.
38 See Teresa Stanton Collett, Heads, Secularists Win; Tails, Believers Lose-Returning
Only Free Exercise to the Political Process, 20 U. ARE. LrrTLE RocK L.J. 689, 697 (1998)
("While the Court has yet to develop this concept, at a minimum it would seem to
encompass cases where the burdens imposed on any one fundamental right are not
sufficient to trigger judicial intervention, but the aggregate burden is sufficient to
require some form of judicial relief.").
39 See Ernest P. Fronzuto, Comment, An Endorsement for the Test of General Applica-
bility: Smith II, Justice Scalia, and the Conflict Between Neutral Laws and the Free Exercise of
Religion, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 713, 730 (1996) (characterizing hybrid claims as
being "legally distinct from 'pure' free exercise claims" since they only "remotely or
partially touch on the free exercise issue"); see alsoJohnJ. Coughlin, Common Sense in
Formation for the Common Good-Justice White's Dissents in the Parochial School Aid Cases:
Patron of Lost Causes or Precursor of Good News, 66 ST. JoHN's L. REV. 261 (1992):
The Court's use of the term "hybrid" seems to mean that each "ancestor" is a
sine qua non of the result (e.g., a nectarine). However, if the same result
would happen even if only one ancestor is present (the due process right),
one must wonder how this is a hybrid.
Id. at 327 n.106.
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rate claims, leaving us with hybrid = 2.40 Professor Richard Duncan
expresses it in this manner:
Clearly, what the Court must have meant is that a less than sufficient
free exercise claim, plus a less than sufficient claim arising under a
different part of the Constitution, together trigger the compelling
interest test. In other words, the cumulative effect of two or more
partial constitutional rights equals one sufficient constitutional
claim.4 1
Put simply, two losers equals one winner.42
2. The Subterfuge Interpretation
A second possible interpretation is what I have entitled the "sub-
terfuge" approach. This interpretation assumes that the hybrid excep-
tion is nothing more than a questionable explanation of past
precedent. It was created in order to hide the direction in which the
law was really moving. Modern courts pretend to uphold religion
under the guise of free exercise but the real protection comes from
other constitutional provisions, most notably speech.
In operating under this interpretation, a court would begin by
analyzing the strength of the "other" constitutional provision. If this
claim were successful, the court would then move on and hold in
favor of the hybrid claim, thus creating a secondary support for the
judgment (although one based solely in dicta). It is under this inter-
pretation that the constitutional strength or weakness of the "other"
right becomes truly relevant. Favored constitutional rights would
combine to create more successful hybrids while disfavored rights
would be quickly dismissed.
40 Commentators appear to agree that this is the correct way to characterize the
formula created by Scalia. See Mark Tushnet, Public and Private Education: Is There a
Constitutional Difference?, 1991 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 43, 71-72 ("It is important to under-
stand that this model makes sense only on the assumption that the second claim
standing alone would also not trigger the balancing process, for otherwise it is the
second claim alone, and without any contribution from the Free Exercise claim, that
does the work.").
Also, Professor Stanley Ingber notes that "no explanation is given why two rights,
each of which, assuming Scalia's analysis, independently cannot justify an exemption,
somehow become empowered by their coupling." Stanley Ingber, Judging Without
Judgment: Constitutional Irrelevancies and the Demise ofDialogue, 46 RUTGERS L. REv. 1473,
1630 (1994).
41 Richard F. Duncan, Who Wants to Stop the Church: Homosexual Rights Legislation,
Public Policy, and Religious Freedom, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 393, 430-31 (1994).
42 Professor Smolla refers to this as a "two-for-one sale [ J." See Smolla, supra note
35, at 930.
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3. Supreme Court Guidance
Unfortunately, since Smith itself, the Supreme Court has not
given any further explanation or guidance regarding hybrid claims. 43
The result of this is disastrous for judicial uniformity and economy.
Analyzing this lack of explanation, one commentator has succinctly
noted:
[L] ower federal and state courts will be relatively free to establish
their own interpretations and analysis of the hybrid exception.
Consequently, few religious objectors will present courts with pure
federal free exercise claims. Instead, plaintiffs will approach the
challenge with an arsenal of interrelated First Amendment rights
including freedom of speech and freedom of association in con-
junction with free exercise.4 4
Whether or not Justice Scalia's characterization of former prece-
dents as hybrids is logical45 or can be accurately derived from the
cases cited is a separate topic which has been covered elsewhere at
length.4 6 This Note does not dwell upon that discussion. Rather, it
analyzes the way in which lower courts have interpreted the hybrid
exception and its possible future application. 47
II. FREE SPEECH HYBRIDS
In pigeon-holing prior cases into the hybrid exception, Justice
Scalia distinguished between two separate categories: (a) those cases
which the Court had subjected to strict scrutiny based on their hybrid
43 Neither Lukumi nor Boerne clarified or affected this analysis. See Ira C. Lupu,
Employment Division v. Smith and the Decline of Supreme Court-Centrism, 1993 BYU L.
REv. 259, 266 ("Nothing in Church of the Lukumi expands, narrows, or clarifies Smith's
pronouncement concerning so-called hybrid right claims.").
44 Renee Skinner, Note, The Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of
Hialeah: Still Sacrificing Free Exercise, 46 BAYLOR L. REV. 259, 278 (1994).
45 See Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 335. ('Justice Scalia's implicit claim-that
free exercise claims are a necessary component of some successful 'hybrid' challenges
but that claims of the same type can never succeed on their own-approaches, and
possibly achieves, incomprehensibility.").
46 See generally Mason, supra note 4.
47 One commentator has argued that the hybrid exception has "limited practical
significance." Fliegel, supra note 19, at 71. However, this reflection was simply a state-
ment of the time, made when RFRA required strict scrutiny anyway and before many
of the lower court rulings applying the exception. SeeWehener, supra note 24, at 507
("While the hybrid claim was obviously a viable tool to protect free exercise rights
after Smith, its application now under the regime of the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act is at least questionable and may not, in all probability, be required at all."). It
is therefore not dispositive of the current state of affairs in free exercise law.
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character of free exercise/free speech,48 and (b) those cases "decided
exclusively upon free speech grounds, [which] have also involved free-
dom of religion."49 No direction was given as to what factors sepa-
rated these two categories or how lower courts should decide which
type of analysis to conduct. But remember that this debate is over the
level of scrutiny to be applied. Free speech claims are often subject to
strict scrutiny when raised by themselves, particularly when they in-
volve a form of content control. Yet Justice Scalia's characterization
seems to imply that the free speech interest involved in the hybrid
exception cases was somehow not enough of an interest to stake the
entire case upon.
After Smith, free exercise does not itself receive the benefit of
strict scrutiny in situations of neutral, generally applicable laws and,
under the logical interpretation, a hybrid could only be created by
combination with a free speech claim that is not sufficient to win on
its own. 50 This leads to the conclusion "that if you hooked up a loser
of a free-exercise claim with a loser of a free-speech claim that you'd
wind up with a winner of a 'hybrid' claim."51 Lower courts, faced with
this position, have not applied the hybrid exception in any such literal
fashion.52
48 E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943); Folett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944). I do not dwell on
these cases since they were all decided prior to the compelling interest test of Sherbert.
See Maureen E. Markey, The Price of Landlord's "Free"Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right to
Discrimination-Free Housing and Privacy, 22 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 699, 831 n.143 (noting
the lack of a need to distinguish these cases).
49 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 882 (1990).
50 This assumes that the Court is applying the hybrid standard in an honest man-
ner and not simply basing its decisions upon the underlying free speech claim. See
Keith Jaasma, Note, The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Responding to Smith; Reconsid-
eringReynolds, 16 WHrrTiER L. REv. 211, 256 (1995) ("Implicit in the Smith majority's
explanation of the 'hybrid' concept, however, is an assertion that the constitutional
rights that joined with free exercise rights to form 'hybrid' protection would have
been inadequate alone to trigger strict scrutiny of the challenged laws.").
51 Mason, supra note 4, at 256 n.302.
52 In fact, although several definite patterns can be traced in hybrid analysis, it is
an area that most courts seem reluctant to analyze in any great depth. See Gressman
& Carmella, supra note 30, at 89 n.101 (noting that "the 'hybrid' concept has been
left largely undeveloped by lower federal courts"). This reluctance is most likely at-
tributable to the small amount of detail that the Supreme Court provided for hybrid
analysis and also the controversial character of the claim.
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A. Free Speech Hybrids in the Federal Courts
(1) The first federal case to raise the hybrid exception was Cor-
nerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings.53 The plaintiff, an evangelical
Christian church, was held to be in violation of the Hastings Zoning
Ordinance for conducting its religious services in an area of the city
which was zoned exclusively industrial. The Church argued (a) that
this was a direct regulation of religious worship, and (b) "that the or-
dinance should be strictly scrutinized because it violates the Church's
right to free exercise of religion as well as the Church's rights to free
speech, equal protection, and due process. '5 4 The court rejected all
of the Church's original claims, granting summary judgment for the
city on the "pure" free exercise, free speech, due process, and equal
protection claims. In analyzing the hybrid claim, it held that
"[b]ecause plaintiffs have failed to establish a violation of another
constitutional right, their free exercise claim alone is not sufficient to
establish a cause of action."55
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the grant of summary
judgment on the free speech and equal protection claims (while up-
holding the pure free exercise and due process judgments) and re-
manded the case for a determination of further issues. 56 "Our
reversal of the summary judgment orders breathes life back into the
Church's 'hybrid rights' claim; thus, the district court should consider
this claim on remand. '5 7 While the church could not argue a free
exercise claim, it could argue a free exercise-based hybrid claim. "In
other words, the freedom of religion claim was utterly superfluous; a
church has freedom only if it can point to some clause in the Constitu-
tion other than the one guaranteeing the free exercise of religion."58
53 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
54 Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 740 F. Supp. 654, 670 (D. Minn.
1990).
55 Id
56 Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of Hastings, 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991).
The court of appeals failed to explain how the city ordinance could be both "a neutral
law of general applicability" for purposes of pure free exercise summary judgment
and yet represent a possible violation of equal protection. It seems as if "generally
applicable" is just another way of phrasing "equal protection of the law." See Kissinger
v. Board of Trustees, 786 F. Supp. 1308, 1313-14 (S.D. Ohio 1992) (holding that an
equal protection claim fails once law is found to be a neutral rule of general applica-
bility); see also Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 540
(1993) ("In determining if the object of a law is a neutral one under the Free Exercise
Clause, we can also find guidance in our equal protection cases.").
57 Cornerstone, 948 F.2d at 473.
58 Michael P. Farris &Jordan W. Lorence, Employment Division v. Smith and the
Need for the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 6 REGENT U. L. REv. 65, 79 (1995).
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This scenario shows clearly that any possible determination by the
lower court would be based primarily upon free speech or equal pro-
tection, with a hybrid claim serving only as a secondary basis for judg-
ment. Summary: Free Speech Possible; Free Exercise Loses; Hybrid Possible.
(2) Society of Separationists, Inc. v. Herman59 involved a prospective
juror (atheist Robin Murray-O'Hair) who refused to take the oath re-
quired of all venire members. The judge offered her the opportunity
to make an affirmation, .and she again refused, contending that an
affirmation was a "religious statement. '60 After unsuccessfully at-
tempting to convince her to make the affirmation, the state judge
held O'Hair in contempt and jailed her for three days. O'Hair filed
suit in district court alleging that her "First and Fourteenth Amend-
ment rights had been violated because she was imprisoned for refus-
ing to take a religious oath."61
The court held that the judge had indeed violated O'Hair's con-
stitutional rights since "the government may not compel affirmation
of religious belief" and this was the effect of requiring either an oath
or an affirmation. 62 It then went on to say: "Our holding in this case is
consistent with [Smith, which] . . . specifically excepts religion-plus-
speech cases from the sweep of its holding. '63 As in Cornerstone, this
statement was only a secondary, nonessential basis for the judgment
which relied primarily upon the "religious belief' exception enunci-
ated by Smith itself.64 Summary: Pure Free Exercise Wins; Hybrid Also
"tWins. "
(3) By far the most intriguing of the hybrid cases is Kissinger v.
Board of Trustees.65 Plaintiff Jennifer Kissinger was a fourth-year stu-
dent at the Ohio State University-College of Veterinary Medicine.
One of the required degree courses involved surgery on live animals
solely for educational purposes, a practice which Ms. Kissinger
claimed violated her religious beliefs. She filed a civil rights suit
against the University, which summarily agreed to provide her with an
alternative curriculum. Unsatisfied, Ms. Kissinger then sought attor-
59 939 F.2d 1207 (5th Gir.), superseded by 959 F. 2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1991) (dis-
missing claim in federal court for lack of standing), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 866 (1992).
60 Society of Separationists, 939 F.2d at 1210.
61 Id. at 1210-11.
62 Id. at 1215 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 877).
63 Id. at 1216. For commentary suggesting that the Herman court may have im-
properly applied the hybrid analysis, see Ronald B. Flowers, Government Accommodation
of Religious-Based Conscientious Objection, 24 SETON HALL L. REv. 695, 724 (1993).
64 The Smith neutral, generally applicable analysis does not apply to "'govern-
mental regulation of religious beliefs as such.'" Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (quoting Sher-
bert, 374 U.S. at 402).
65 786 F. Supp. 1308 (S.D. Ohio 1992), affd, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993).
i998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ney's fees for the costs of the suit. She argued a hybrid claim "because
in addition to the free exercise claim, she asserted causes of action
under the due process, free speech, and freedom of association, and
equal protection clauses. ' 66 The district court rejected these claims
since they would not have provided even a minimum basis for compel-
ling the university to provide an alternative curriculum.
67
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the denial of fees but, in a surprisingly
vehement passage, utterly rejected the use of the hybrid claim.
We do not see how a state regulation would violate the Free Exer-
cise Clause if it implicates other constitutional rights but would not
violate the free Exercise Clause if it did not implicate other constitu-
tional rights .... Such an outcome is completely illogical; therefore,
at least until the Supreme Court holds that legal standards under
the Free Exercise Clause vary depending on whether other constitu-
tional rights are implicated, we will not use a stricter legal standard
than that used in Smith to evaluate generally applicable, excep-
tionless state regulations under the Free Exercise Clause. 68
Rather than follow the lead of other courts which were merely
using the hybrid exception as a cover up for basing decisions on the
Free Speech Clause, the Sixth Circuit chose to reject such an "illogi-
cal" test.69 Summary: Hybrid Analysis Rejected.
(4) In Jane L. v. Bangerter,70 abortion-providing physicians chal-
lenged the Utah Abortion Act, which set limits on abortions, on the
grounds that it legally mandated a religious viewpoint of the Mormon
Church. An unsympathetic district court made short work of their
hybrid claim.
Plaintiffs allege that the Act interferes with their Free Exercise
rights, along with their right to freedom of speech .... [T] he "hy-
brid rights" exception present in [ Yoder] does not apply here. Here,
the freedom of speech argument fails because there is no free
speech right to solicit criminal acts .... Since the Utah law is not
aimed at violation of the free exercise of religion, and no additional
constitutional rights are violated so as to meet the "hybrid rights"
66 Id. at 1313.
67 See id. at 1314.
68 Kissinger, 5 F.3d at 180.
69 The Kissinger court was the first to denounce what Kent Greenawalt has de-
scribed as a situation in which "free exercise claims [are] required for a result, though
they could not conceivably be sufficient by themselves." Greenawalt, supra note 29, at
335.
70 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992), affd in part, rev'd in part on other grounds, 61
F.3d 1493 (10th Cir. 1995).
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exception, this court holds that the Free Exercise claim must be
dismissed.7 1
No free speech rights equals no hybrid and no strict scrutiny for reli-
gion. Summary: Free Speech Loses; Free Exercise Loses; Hybrid Loses.
(5) In Alabama & Coushatta Tribes v. Trustees of Big Sandy In-
dependent School District,72 Native American students brought an action
challenging the school district's dress code, which restricted the hair
length of all male students. The students claimed that long hair was
religiously mandated and thus the regulation violated their free exer-
cise rights.78 The court accepted the sincerity of these beliefs and
then went on to analyze the interest of the government in enforcing
this regulation. After a lengthy debate over whether or not Smith ap-
plies outside of the criminal context,74 the court held that "the pres-
ent case does not require a resolution of [this issue] ... as plaintiffs
have alleged a hybrid claim of free exercise, free speech, due process,
and equal protection rights. '75 The court proceeded to apply strict
scrutiny to the hybrid claim and held that the state had failed to
demonstrate an important state objective. It then went on to dismiss
the due process and equal protection claims, while holding the school
regulation unconstitutional under the Free Speech Clause. This case
is unusual since the hybrid was decided before the speech issue, but,
once again, the free speech claim by itself appears to have been a
sufficient basis for the decision. Summary: Free Speech Wins; Hybrid
Wins.
(6) Rourke v. New York State Department of Correctional Services7 6
raised the question of how well hybrid rights have been established in
free exercise law. Rourke, a Native American, was fired from his posi-
tion as a prison correctional officer after refusing to cut his long hair
for religious reasons. He filed a § 1983 action against the state and
several individual actors, claiming a violation of his First Amendment
rights. The individual defendants moved to dismiss the claims against
71 Id. at 1547 (footnote omitted).
72 817 F. Supp. 1319 (E.D. Tex. 1993), remanded for unstated reason, 20 F.3d 469
(5th Cir. 1994) (unpublished opinion).
73 The plaintiffs also argued that the regulation undermined "the right of parents
and the Tribe to direct the religious upbringing of their children." Alabama & Cou-
shatta, 817 F. Supp. at 1328. The district court found a violation of this right but
never combined it with the hybrid analysis.
74 See supra text accompanying notes 27-28.
75 Alabama & Coushatta 817 F. Supp. at 1332. For some reason, the court did not
add into this framework "the parental right to guide their children's education and
upbringing" which it held was also "a valid constitutional claim." Id. at 1334.
76 915 F. Supp. 525 (N.D.N.Y. 1995).
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them on the basis of qualified immunity since "'there was no preexist-
ing law that would put reasonable officials on notice that their actions
were unlawful."77 The district court disagreed. After determining
that Smith governed the case, the court looked to "determine if the
plaintiff has a hybrid case. If, in fact, the plaintiff has a hybrid claim,
then the defendants cannot prevail on their motion."78
The court went on to hold that the plaintiff's claim did fit within
the boundaries of the hybrid exception since his hair was worn in a
symbolic fashion to denote his membership in a religion. "Use of sym-
bols to express ideas or beliefs has been held to implicate the right to
freedom of speech and expression. Accordingly, this court finds that
the plaintiff has implicated the free exercise clause and at least one
other right as mandated by the now statutorily overruled Smith."79
Since this law had been "well-settled" at the time of the termination,
defendant's motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity failed.80
Summary: Free Speech Possible; Free Exercise Possible; Hybrid Possible.
(7) Chalifoux v. New Caney Independent School Districts ' involved
another student challenge, this time to a school prohibition on gang
related apparel which was extended to the wearing of "rosaries as a
necklace outside the shirt."82 After careful analysis, the court found a
constitutional violation of the student's free speech rights, but rather
than ending the case there, it moved on to analyze the hybrid "reli-
gion-plus-speech" claim: 83
Plaintiffs' causes of action combine free exercise of religion and
free speech claims; accordingly, the heightened level of scrutiny
used in hybrid cases applies. Therefore, pursuant to the holding in
Yoder, this Court must perform a balancing test to determine
whether the school's regulation bears more than a "reasonable rela-
tion" to [the district's] stated objective.... [T] he Court finds that
the prohibition on wearing rosaries violates Plaintiffs' First Amend-
ment rights.8 4
Free speech had already decided the case, so why not tack on an extra
right? Summary: Free Speech Wins; Hybrid Wins.
77 Id at 540 (quoting from Defendant's Memorandum of Law at 27).
78 Id. at 541.
79 Id. (citations omitted).
80 See id.
81 976 F. Supp. 659 (S.D. Tex. 1997).
82 Id. at 664.
83 1& at 671.
84 Id.
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(8) In re Young85 presented the question of hybrid claims in the
bankruptcy setting. In 1991, debtor Bruce Young contributed $13,450
to the Crystal Evangelical Free Church. Less than a year later, he en-
tered Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The appointed trustee brought a pro-
ceeding against the Church to recover these funds as "fraudulent
transfers," and the Church resisted. On appeal to the district court,
the church argued both a pure free exercise claim and a hybrid, free
speech claim. "The church argues that through their contributions
the debtors were supporting the dissemination of a particular message
protected by the Free Speech Clause. The church asserts that this 'hy-
brid' free speech/freedom of religion argument must be analyzed
under the compelling interest and less restrictive means test. '86
The district court rejected both of these contentions. The pure
free exercise claim failed under the Smith neutral, generally applica-
ble test and the hybrid failed because a "limitation on the amount that
a person may contribute to a cause 'entails only a marginal restriction
upon the contributor's ability to engage in free communication.'"87
Without free speech, there was nothing to "combine" with.88 Summary:
Free Speech Loses; Free Exercise Loses; Hybrid Loses.
B. Free Speech Hybrids in the State Courts
The only state court case to significantly discuss the hybrid free
speech issue89 was First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle.90 The Church
85 152 B.,. 939 (D. Minn. 1993), rev'd, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th Cir. 1996), vacated and
remanded, 117 S. Ct. 2502 (1997), on remand, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998).
86 Id. at 953.
87 Id. at 954 (quoting Buckley v. Vako, 424 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1976) (per curiam)).
88 The Eighth Circuit reversed this decision based upon RFRA, 82 F.3d 1407 (8th
Cir. 1996), but the Supreme Court vacated and remanded in light of Boerne. In re
Young, 117 S.Ct. 2502 (1997). On remand, the Eighth Circuit upheld its decision by
maintaining that RFRA was still applicable to federal action. In re Young, 141 F.3d 854
(8th Cir. 1998).
A similar bankruptcy tithing claim was raised and summarily rejected in Wagues-
pack v. Rodriguez, 220 B.R. 31 (W.D. La. 1998). For commentary arguing that this
situation represents the perfect hybrid, see Donald R. Price & Mark C. Rahdert, Dis-
tributing the First Fruits: Statutory and Constitutional Implications of Tithing in Bankruptcy,
26 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 853, 903 (1993).
89 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) raised a free speech hybrid
but the court refused to analyze under Smith and based the decision instead on the
state constitution.
This lack of state court decisions on the issue can be traced partly to the passage
of RFRA which required strict scrutiny already, thus making hybrid analysis unneces-
sary. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 969 (Cal. 1996). After
plaintiff raised a free speech claim, the court said, "We need not, and do not, consider
the 'hybrid rights' issue. [Even if Smith] does preserve the 'compelling interest' test
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had been designated as an historic landmark and board permission
was required to make any alterations to the existing structure (even
for liturgical purposes). The Washington Supreme Court struck down
the application of the ordinance on free exercise grounds, but the
U.S. Supreme Court vacated this judgment and remanded the case for
review in light of Smith.91 Once again, the Washington court held the
ordinance unconstitutional as applied since it was "not neutral and
generally applicable. Further Smith II does not apply because the case
presents a 'hybrid situation': First Covenant's claim involves the free
exercise clause in conjunction with free speech." 92 At best, hybrid
analysis was a third basis for the decision since the court relied primar-
ily upon the pure free exercise claim, the free speech claim, and also
upon the Washington State Constitution.93 Summary: Free Exercise
Wins; Hybrid Also "Wins."
C. Free Speech Hybrid Summary
A summary of the published hybrid free speech cases reveals the
following: the hybrid claim won (i.e. the free exercise plus claim re-
ceived at least strict scrutiny) in six of the nine free speech hybrid
cases (Cornerstone Bible Church, Society of Separationists, Alabama & Cou-
shatta Tribes, Rourke, Chalifoux, and First Covenant Church). In every
one of these cases, the free speech claim had a sufficient life of its own
to warrant analysis based upon a compelling interest standard (and
even to possibly win an exemption).94 "The so-called hybrid situation
[did] not raise the level of protection accorded regulations of reli-
gious interests. Religious speech receives the same level of protection
under the speech clause as does secular speech." 95 The courts' reli-
in cases involving 'hybrid rights,' the effect is simply to require us to apply the same
test we must apply in any event under [RFRA]." Id. at 921.
90 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992).
91 787 P.2d 1352 (Wash. 1990), cert. granted, judgment vacated and remanded, 499
U.S. 901 (1991).
92 First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 182. The free speech involved was the state-
ment given to religious viewers when they looked at the exterior or interior of the
church. "[W]hen the State controls the architectural 'proclamation' of religious be-
lief inherent in its church's exterior it effectively burdens religious speech." Id.
93 See id. at 185 (" [W] e eschew the 'uncertainty' of Smith II and rest our decision
also on independent grounds under the Washington constitution.").
94 See Fry, supra note 19, at 847 ("Subsequent lower court case law has interpreted
Justice Scalia's hybrid situation to require free exercise claimants to assert free speech
rights that are strong enough that, were they standing alone, they would be sufficient
claims.").
95 Marci A. Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the Supreme Court's Free Exer-
ciseJurisprudence: A Theological Account of the Failure to Protect Religious Conduct, 54 OHIO
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ance upon a hybrid claim always represented a secondary basis,9 6 a
further board blocking the doorjust in case anyone tried to break into
the validity of the decision.
Other "type" hybrids have received similar (if less successful)
treatment at the hands of the lower courts.
III. PARENTAL RIGHT TO EDUCATE HYBRIDs
A parent's right to educate her children is a right implicitly de-
rived from the Fourteenth Amendment and first enunciated by the
Supreme Court in Pierce v. Society of Sisters.97 Unlike free speech, it is
not a "fundamental" right. Governmental action which infringes
upon a parent's right to educate is constitutional if it serves a legiti-
mate state interest under the rational basis standard of review.98
Under a parental rights hybrid, "a party may claim improper in-
fringement of free exercise rights if the party can simultaneously
claim infringement of the right to choose his or her children's reli-
gious education." 99 According to the Smith majority, this was the type
of claim involved in Wisconsin v. Yoder.100 Recall that Yoder was the
sole case outside of the unemployment compensation area where the
compelling interest test of Sherbert was applied with full consistency.
In drafting his opinion for Smith, Justice Scalia somehow needed to
distinguish Yoderin order to insulate its holding from the new neutral,
generally applicable standard. The hybrid exception was his way of
ST. LJ. 713, 742 (1993). Professor Hamilton used this phrase to describe the Court's
past precedent but it applies equally well to later lower court application of the hybrid
doctrine.
96 The decision which comes the closest to using free speech hybrid analysis as a
primary basis is the California Court of Appeals decision in Smith v. Fair Employment
and Housing Commission, 30 Cal. Rptr. 2d 395 (Ct. App. 1994). The court described
the case as "a paradigm of the hybrid genus." Id. at 403. However, this decision was
overturned two years later by the California Supreme Court in Smith v. FairEmployment
and Housing Commission, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996).
97 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
98 See San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
99 Health Serv. v. Temple Baptist Church, 814 P.2d 130, 135 (N.M. Ct. App.
1991).
100 406 U.S. 205 (1972) But see Frederick Mark Gedicks, The Improbability of Reli-
gion Clause Theory, 27 SETON HALL L. REv. 1233, 1254 (1997) ("[T]he Smith Court's
reformulation of Yoder as a 'hybrid rights' decision is really a thinly disguised judg-
ment that this decision should not have been tied to the Free Exercise Clause in the
first place.").
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doing this. 101 In essence, this exception merely retained what had
been clearly stated in Yoder
Pierce stands as a charter of the rights of parents to direct the reli-
gious upbringing of their children. And, when the interests of
parenthood are combined with a free exercise claim of the nature revealed
by this record, more than merely a "reasonable relation to some
purpose within the competency of the State" is required to sustain
the validity of the State's requirement under the First
Amendment.102
Unlike the free speech hybrid, a hybrid based upon a parent's right to
educate has been argued almost exclusively in the state courts.'03
A. "Parental Right to Educate" Hybrids in the Federal Courts
(1) In Brown v. Hot, Sexy and Safer Productions, Inc.,10 4 the parents
of public high school children brought suit alleging that the students'
compelled attendance at a sexually explicit presentation had violated
several of their constitutionally protected rights. Along with a claimed
violation of their right to educate, the parents stated that the show
"'imping[ed] on their sincerely held religious values regarding chas-
tity and morality,' and thereby violated the Free Exercise Clause of the
First Amendment." 105 However, the court dismissed the parental
rights claim because there was no right "to restrict the flow of informa-
tion in the public schools." 0 6 Without a "privacy or substantive due
process claim" to tack free exercise onto, the school's neutral, gener-
ally applicable rule was upheld. 10 7 Summay: Parental Rights Loses; Free
Exercise Loses; Hybrid Loses.
(2) The possibility that children themselves might be able to suc-
cessfully raise a parental rights hybrid claim was raised in Vandiver v.
101 See Greenawalt, supra note 29, at 335 ("Most scholars assume this language was
a make-weight to 'explain' Yoder that lacks enduring significance."); see alsoJay S. By-
bee, Substantive Due Process and Free Exercise of Religion: Meyer, Pierce and the Origins of
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 25 CAP. U. L. REv. 887, 890 (1996) ("Yoderas a pure Free Exercise
case would seem to be dead. But as something else-the Court called it a "hybrid"-it
seems very much alive."); Lupu, supra note 43, at 267 (suggesting that the hybrid
theory may be no more "than an unprincipled attempt to pretend that Yoder survived
Smith.").
102 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (emphasis added).
103 Six of the nine cases raising this hybrid were argued in the state courts and
only three were raised in the federal arena.
104 68 F.3d 525 (1st Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1044 (1996).
105 Id. at 537.
106 Id. at 534.
107 Id at 539.
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Hardin County Board of Education.08 Brian Vandiver, an eleventh
grade home schooler, sought to enroll in the twelfth grade at the local
public school. However, the school required that Brian take
equivalency tests to prove that he was academically prepared for the
twelfth grade curriculum. Brian's parents initially agreed but after
"seeing how much studying would be necessary to handle this com-
bined load, [they] decided that the burden of testing and extra
courses would prove too onerous for Brian. For his part, Brian de-
cided on the basis of his religious belief that the load was unfair and
more than what God would want him to bear."'0 9 When the school
board refused to grant an exemption to the equivalency-testing re-
quirement, the Vandivers brought suit alleging a deprivation of their
free exercise rights.
Unfortunately for Brian's parents, they had waited too long to
bring the suit and found their claims barred by the statute of limita-
tions. "As a result, only if Brian's ov-n free exercise challenge is joined
with other constitutional concerns may his claim survive the free exer-
cise standard of Smith."" 0 Brian could assert the same right in reli-
gious education that his parents possessed under Pierce and Yoder.
However, "Brian's alleged interest is in minimizing the burdens of
test-taking, not in religious education.""' Since freedom from test-
taking was not a constitutional right, Brian was left without an attach-
ment for his free exercise claim and the court ruled against him. Sum-
mary: Parental Rights Loses; Free Exercise Loses; Hybrid Loses.
(3) In Swanson v. Guthrie Independent School District,"2 home-
schooling parents wished to have their daughter enrolled in the pub-
lic school for a few classes which were difficult to teach (such as music,
foreign language, and science). However, the school board refused to
admit students who were not enrolled full time because they would
not be counted for state aid purposes." 3 In analyzing the case, the
Tenth Circuit first dismissed the pure free exercise claim because the
policy of the school board was neutral and of general application.
Turning to the hybrid claim, the court held:
We note that this case illustrates the difficulty of applying the Smith
exception. At a minimum, however, ... it cannot be true that a
plaintiff can simply invoke the parental rights doctrine, combine it
with a claimed free-exercise right, and thereby force the govern-
108 925 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1991).
109 Id. at 929.
110 Id. at 933.
111 Id
112 135 F.3d 694 (10th Cir. 1998).
113 See id. at 696-97.
1998]
NOTRE DAME LAW REVIEW
ment to demonstrate the presence of a compelling state interest.
Whatever the Smith hybrid-rights theory may ultimately mean, we
believe that it at least requires a colorable showing of infringement
of recognized and specific constitutional rights, rather than the mere invoca-
tion of a general right such as the right to control the education of one's
child.114
Relying upon the Hot, Sexy and Safer case, the court found that the
parents did not have a specific right to force a public school to accept
their children on a part-time basis. Without such a right, no hybrid
was possible.'1 5 Summary: Parental Rights Loses; Free Exercise Loses; Hy-
brid Loses.
B. "Parental Right to Educate" Hybrids in the State Courts
(1) In State v. DeLaBruere,116 the parents of a minor child were
charged under a Vermont truancy law for failing to send their son to a
state licensed school. The parents moved to dismiss the charges on
the grounds that the state truancy law as applied violated their rights
under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and under
Chapter I, Article 3 of the Vermont Constitution. In analyzing the
decision, the court noted that strict scrutiny was still required even
after Smith since "this is a 'hybrid situation' implicating more than a
free exercise claim and, thus, the State must show more than that the
truancy law is of general applicability and is valid and neutral."" 7
Even under strict scrutiny, the parents lost their challenge because
Vermont was able to demonstrate a compelling governmental interest
in the truancy law.1 8 Summary: Hybrid Receives Strict Scrutiny but Loses.
(2) If the parental right to educate has been lost, then no hybrid
can be formed. This issue was touched upon in In re Marriage of
Lange." 9 In this divorce action, the Lutheran mother was given cus-
tody of the children while the Catholic father was granted limited visi-
tation rights. A restriction upon these visitation rights (based on a
statute giving religious education rights to the custodial parent) pre-
vented the father from teaching his children religion because his "reli-
gious beliefs concerning the role of females is detrimental to the
114 Id. at 700 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
115 See id
116 577 A.2d 254 (Vt. 1990).
117 Id. at 261 n.8. However, this case was decided immediately after the Smith test
was announced and is more properly viewed as applying the old Sherbert analysis
rather than the new hybrid test. See id. at 263 n.10 (noting that since the state had
proven a compelling interest, it did not matter what test was applied).
118 See id. at 272.
119 502 N.W.2d 143 (Wis. Ct. App. 1993).
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children."' 20 The father challenged this restriction as a parental
rights hybrid but the court ruled against him. Having "lost the paren-
tal right to choose his children's religion," the father failed to present
a valid hybrid claim.1 1 Summary: Parental Rights Loses; Free Exercise
Loses; Hybrid Loses.
(3) Several cases in which education hybrids have been raised in-
volve claims brought by institutions rather than individual parents.
Hill-Murray Federation v. Hill-Murray High School1 22 involved the consti-
tutionality of applying the Minnesota Labor Relations Act to a private
religious school. The school attempted to create an education hybrid,
but the court rejected this claim because the school did not have an
interest in the education of the child; only the parent did. 'We find
no hybrid interest on the part of Hill-Murray and note that the rights
of parents in the education of their children as outlined in Yoder are
altogether different than the rights of a religiously affiliated employer
with respect to the control of and authority over their lay employ-
ees."' 2 3 Summary: Parental Rights Loses; Free Exercise Loses; Hybrid Loses.
(4) The exact same issue was involved in New York State Employ-
ment Relations Board v. Christ the King Regional High School.124 In analyz-
ing the school's attempted hybrid claim, the court held:
The School's argument suggests that the application of the State
Labor Relations Act to it would interfere with fundamental rights of
parents of students to direct the religious education of their chil-
dren. This argument is flawed and unpersuasive because, as we ana-
lyze the matter, the Supreme Court in Smith did not intend its
hybrid exception to turn back on itself in circumstances such as this
singularly generic First Amendment setting and circumstance.
Rather, the Court expressly referenced the hybrid exceptional situa-
tions to free exercise settings in which other discrete constitutional
protections are also implicated. 125
Since no parents were involved in the action, the School could not
raise another constitutional right to produce a hybrid and the claim
was summarily dismissed.' 26 Summary: Parental Rights Loses; Free Exercise
Loses; Hybrid Loses.
120 Id. at 145.
121 Id. at 155.
122 487 N.W.2d 857 (Minn. 1992).
123 Id. at 863.
124 660 N.Y.S.2d 359 (1997).
125 Id. at 363 (citation omitted).
126 The same issue was at stake in South Jersey Catholic School Teachers Organization v.
St. Theresa, 696 A.2d 709 (N.J. 1997). There, the court came to the same conclusion
("Allowing lay teachers to unionize does not interfere with any parental decision mak-
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(5) The final case in which an institutional actor attempted to
raise an educational hybrid was Health Services v. Temple Baptist
Church.'27 The Temple Baptist Church brought an action against the
state health services department which required all child care centers
to be licensed. One of the requirements of licensing, however, was a
prohibition on the spanking of children. The Church claimed that
this prohibition violated their religious rights since "[i] t has a policy,
which the church believes is mandated by the Bible, by which the
teachers spank the children when they misbehave."' 28 The court ad-
dressed the issue head on as whether or not an institution could raise
a hybrid involving a right of its members.
In this case, there are no individuals with children in the child care
center claiming a deprivation of a parent's right to direct his or her
children's religious education. Thus, the church stands or falls on
its own bare right to run a child care facility according to church
doctrine, not on the rights of its member parents. We do not deal
with a hybrid right in this case.' 29
Without individual parental claims to guarantee it strict scrutiny, the
Church was unable to prevail. Summary: Parental Rights Loses; Free Exer-
cise Loses; Hybrid Loses.
(6) The sole case in which an education hybrid was used to pro-
duce a victory for the religious party was People v. DeJonge,'30 in which a
home-schooling couple challenged the constitutionality of a Michigan
instructor certification requirement. The parents were convicted of
violating the education law, fined $200 each, and placed on two years
probation.1 3 ' They challenged their conviction and eventually came
before a very friendly Michigan Supreme Court which essentially dis-
agreed with the new Smith test.'3 2 The court immediately squeezed
the Dejonges into the education hybrid, determining that "Michigan's
teacher certification requirement must undergo strict scrutiny to sur-
vive a free exercise challenge." Upon applying strict scrutiny, the
ing authority."), but went on to protect their holding by conducting heightened anal-
ysis anyway ("We will, nonetheless, conduct the Smith 'compelling state interest'
analysis required for hybrid claims."). Id at 722.
127 814 P.2d 130 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991).
128 Id. at 131.
129 Id. at 136 (citation omitted).
130 501 N.W.2d 127 (Mich. 1993).
131 Id. at 130.
132 See 501 N.W.2d at 134 n.27 ("We are not unaware of the criticism generated in
reaction to Smith ... Nevertheless, this Court must follow the interpretation of the
Free Exercise Clause in the prevailing opinions of the United States Supreme Court,
'even though we may be in accord with the dissenting opinions in those cases.'")
(citation omitted).
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court held the certification requirement unconstitutional since it was
not the least restrictive alternative for achieving the state's interest.'33
However, even in this case, the court noted that strict scrutiny was
already required by the Michigan Constitution (thus making the hy-
brid claim unnecessary). 34 Summary: Parental Rights Wins; Hybrid
Wins.
C. Parental Right to Educate Hybrid Summary
Of the nine published 3 5 parental hybrid claims raised, strict scru-
tiny was only applied in two of them (DeLaBreuere and Dejonge, which
ended in an exemption). Since a hybrid is merely a combination of a
"dead" free exercise claim and another "alive" claim, the strength of
the hybrid will always turn upon the strength of the underlying "alive"
claim. Thus, the limited success rate of parental hybrids (in compari-
son to free speech hybrids) demonstrates a strong correlation to the
weakness of a parent's right to educate. 36 This further strengthens
the proposition that courts analyze hybrids based solely upon the
strength or weakness of the parental rights liberty interest without any
reference to the underlying free exercise claim.
IV. ASSOCIATION
The only case to seriously address associational hybrids (and
which did so in a devastatingly direct way) was Salvation Army v. New
Jersey Department of Community Affairs.'37 The Salvation Army ran a
family center (the Paterson Center) for the disadvantaged which was
designed to bring residents to God through a structured living envi-
133 See id. at 134-35.
134 See id. at 134 n.27 ("We do hold, however, that the Michigan Constitution man-
dates that strict scrutiny ... be applied in the instant case.").
135 For unpublished parental rights hybrid cases, see, for example:
Christ College v. Board of Supervisors, No. 90-2406, 1991 WL 179102 (4th Cir. Apr. 8,
1991), which involved a § 1983 action brought by parents who were denied a permit
to build or operate a schoolhouse. The court dismissed the claim for failure to prove
that the zoning laws burdened their exercise of religion.
Johnson v. Dade County Public Schools, No. 91-2952-CIV-UUB, 1992 WL 466902
(S.D. Fla. Nov. 25, 1992), which involved a parental challenge to a sex information
telephone hotline promoted by the school. The court rejected the hybrid for a fail-
ure to prove governmental coercion to use the hotline.
136 The foundation of a parent's right to educate in the Fourteenth Amendment
may be the cause for the limited success of parental hybrids. "[B]ecause it depends
upon a judge-made right of parental control as a boost to the textual right of free
exercise, it is the most controversial member of the hybrid rights set." Lupu, supra
note 43, at 267.
137 919 F.2d 183 (3rd Cir. 1990).
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ronment. In 1979, New Jersey passed the Rooming and Boarding
House Act which required licensing and set standards for all facilities
operating as boarding houses. The Bureau of Rooming and Boarding
House Standards notified the Paterson Center that it must obtain a
license under the new statute, but instead of complying, the Salvation
Army sought an exemption from the district court based upon its reli-
gious beliefs. 138 In particular, it argued that because it "fulfills its cen-
tral religious mission at its Adult Rehabilitation Centers through a
comprehensive program of spiritual teaching, counseling and work
therapy," its freedom of religious association had been infringed.1 39
The district court granted summary judgment for the state and the
Salvation Army appealed.
The Third Circuit began its hybrid analysis140 by discussing
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson'4l and Roberts v. United States
Jaycees,142 which established and defined the constitutional right of as-
sociation. As for the first kind of association ("intimate association"),
the court noted that this protection "attaches only to 'certain kinds of
highly personal relationships,' such as marriage and family relation-
ships, which are essential to 'the ability independently to define one's
identity that is central to any concept of liberty.' '143 The Supreme
Court had not found religion to fall under this category of "highly
personal relationships," and so the Third Circuit refused to accept any
associational hybrid based upon "intimate association."' 44
The second type of associational right is known as "expressive as-
sociation," the right to assemble for the purpose of enjoying another
constitutional right. In this sense, it derives from an already existing
constitutional protection. 45 The court found such a right on the part
of the Salvation Army but held that it did not affect the case at hand.
We would not expect a derivative right to receive greater protection
than the right from which it Was derived. In the context of the right
to exercise of one's religious convictions, we think it would be par-
138 See id. at 190.
139 Id. at 197.
140 The court had already held that the Army's free exercise claim failed by itself.
See 919 F.2d at 196.
141 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
142 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
143 Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 198 (citation omitted) (quoting Roberts v. United
States Jaycees).
144 Id.
145 See id. at 199 ("[The Supreme Court] has made it clear that the right to expres-
sive association is a derivative right, which has been implied from the First Amend-
ment in order to assure that those rights expressly secured by that amendment can be
meaningfully exercised.").
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ticularly anomalous if corporate exercise received greater protec-
tion than individual exercise - if, for example, the right to
congregational prayer received greater protection than the right to
private prayer.146
Having already dismissed the Salvation Army's pure free exercise
claim, the court refused to recognize any associational hybrid chal-
lenge to state action unless such action was "directly addressed to reli-
gious association."'147 It dismissed the hybrid rights claim but
remanded for further determination of free speech associational
rights.
Salvation Army effectively closed the door on later associational
hybrid claims. 148 The only other cases to even raise such claims saw
them rapidly dismissed or passed over as a basis forjudgment.149 The
analysis of Salvation Amy is convincing on the level of associational
rights except for its attempt to limit the application of Smith associa-
tional hybrids to those "situations where state action is directly ad-
dressed to association for religious purposes."' 5 0 Such situations will
already be subjected to strict scrutiny under the first part of Smith,
which retains such analysis for all actions which are not neutral and
generally applicable. Instead, it is simply easier to say that "no hybrid
right based upon religious association can survive Smith."15 '
V. OTHER HYBRm CLAAMS
The language of Smith leaves it essentially unclear as to what types
of claims can be combined with free exercise to form a valid hybrid.152
Justice Scalia spoke only about a combination with "other constitu-
146 Id.
147 Id. at 199-200.
148 The later case ofJane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992) rejected
the possibility of associational hybrids for intimate association but for different rea-
sons. It held that hybrid analysis was strictly limited to free exercise rights combined
with communicative or parental rights. See id. at 1547 n.1l.
149 The other cases which raised an associational hybrid claim were Kissinger v.
Board of Trustees, 5 F.3d 177 (6th Cir. 1993) (rejecting hybrid analysis), SouthJersey
Catholic Sch. Teachers v. St. Theresa, 696 A.2d 709, 722-23 (N.J. 1997) (no right to associ-
ate in employment when right to unionize at stake) and State v. Hershberger, 462
N.W.2d 393 (Minn. 1990) (decided on state constitutional grounds).
150 Salvation Army, 919 F.2d at 200 n.9.
151 Id. at 203 (Becker, J., concurring). But see Fry, supra note 19, at 852-53 (argu-
ing that an associational hybrid is still possible after Salvation Army).
152 See Marie Elise Lasso, Note, Employment Division v. Smith: The Supreme Court
Improves the State of Free Exercise Doctrine, 12 ST. Louis U. PUB. L. REv. 569, 596-97
(1993) ("The federal courts, however, have not yet precisely defined the type or com-
bination of rights that is required in a 'hybrid' case.").
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tional protections,"15 3 but did not restrict this to "fundamental ights"
or those found in the Bill of Rights. 154 The three examples which
Smith lays out (free speech, association, and parental right to educate)
are based on the First Amendment and a Fourteenth Amendment lib-
erty interest. In distinguishing the facts of the Smith case from the
hybrid situation, Justice Scalia used language which appears to limit
possible hybrids to these three areas. The Oregon drug law in Smith
was not a hybrid since it presented "a free exercise claim unconnected
with any communicative activity or parental right' and did not "attempt to
regulate religious beliefs, the communication of religious beliefs, or the rais-
ing of one's children in those beliefs."'155
The absence of any mention of other constitutional hybrids can
be viewed in one of two ways: (1) the three enumerated rights are the
only possible hybrid combinations, 56 or (2) any constitutional right
can be joined with free exercise for this new analysis. The second view
begins with the notion that Justice Scalia was merely involved in
describing past precedent-precedent in which the Court had never
decided a free exercise case on a combined basis with other constitu-
tional rights (such as the right to privacy). 157 Thus, the absence of
other specified rights in Smith would not close the door to their
existence.
Plaintiffs and academics have almost universally accepted the lat-
ter interpretation and attempted to use the hybrid exception as a
means to expand free exercise protection as much as possible.158 This
view of Smith has led the academy to suggest a veritable myriad of
hybrid "wannabes." Some of the "combination" rights suggested in-
153 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881 (1990).
154 But see American Friends Serv. Comm. v. Thomburgh, 941 F.2d 808, 810 (9th
Cir. 1991) (noting that the other constitutional claim for a hybrid must be
"substantive.").
155 Smith, 494 U.S. at 882 (emphasis added).
156 This was the view accepted by the district court in Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F.
Supp. 1537 (D. Utah 1992). The plaintiffs attempted to "come within the 'hybrid
rights' exception in Yoder by asserting several alleged violations of the 13th and 14th
Amendments .... However, these claims go beyond the formulation of 'hybrid rights'
exception established by the Supreme Court in Smith." Id. at 1547 n.11.
157 See Fry, supra note 19, at 854 ("Justice Scalia's omission of privacy and equal
protection hybrids may be related to the existing state of case law; the Supreme Court
has not decided any cases in which it found a free exercise claim linked with the right
to privacy or with equal protection.").
158 See Lupu, supra note 43, at 266 ("Whatever the theoretical explanation for
greater receptivity to 'free exercise plus' than 'free exercise pure,' a great many free
exercise claims might be recast to take advantage of this construct.").
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clude: (1) Native American Indian rights,159 (2) the right to marry,160
(3) the right to divorce, 161 (4) the right to receive information, 6 2 (5)
the right to abortion, 16 3 (6) the right "to live in a particular arrange-
ment,"x64 (7) the right to freedom of conscience, 165 (8) the right to
exclude others from property, 66 and (9) "the right of family members
to determine the medical treatment of their incompetent family mem-
bers."167 Even the accepted claim of free speech has been invoked to
justify some unique hybrids, including the religious "use of brain-
washing as a recruiting method."168 If the possible hybrid combina-
159 See Sharon L. O'Brien, Freedom of Religion in Indian Country, 56 MONT. L. REV.
451, 474 (1995) ("Courts' acknowledgment of the government's obligation to protect
Indian existence under the trust relationship should provide the courts with the nec-
essary 'hybrid' situation described by Scalia in the Smith case.").
160 See Richard L. Elbert, Comment, Love, God, and Country: Religious Freedom and
the Marriage Penalty Tax, 5 SETON HALL CONSr. L.J. 1171, 1219 (1995) ("[E]ven under
Smith, a challenge to the marriage penalty involves a 'hybrid' situation such that strict
scrutiny would be appropriate.").
161 See Edward S. Nadel, New York's Get Laws: A Constitutional Analysis, 27 COLUM.
J.L. & Soc. PRoBs. 55, 94 (1993) ("In the case of a get, the husband is also asserting a
hybrid claim, since he is relying upon both free exercise and the constitutionally guar-
anteed right to dissolve his marriage .. ").
162 See Enid Trucios-Haynes, Religion and the Immigration and Nationality Act: Using
Old Saws on New Bones, 9 GEO. ImMIcGR LJ. 1, 54 (1995) ("A hybrid constitutional claim
exists because the right of association and to receive information may be implicated
by the denial of religious worker classification to an American member of a religious
denomination.").
163 See Susan E. Looper-Friedman, "Keep Your Laws Off My Body": Abortion Regula-
tion and the Takings Clause, 29 NEw ENG. L. REv. 253, 269 (1995) ("While the right to
privacy or liberty in connection with abortion may possibly be considered a funda-
mental right to which free exercise is closely tied, it remains to be seen if the Supreme
Court is serious about enforcing the hybrid exception in Smith.") (footnote omitted).
164 Jaasma, supra note 50, at 257 ("Arguably, the rights to marry, to live in a partic-
ular arrangement, or to raise children in a particular manner could be considered
with free exercise rights to entitle religiously motivated polygamy to strict scrutiny
protection as a 'hybrid' of constitutional rights.").
165 See Paul M. Landskroener, Note, Not the Smallest Grain of Incense: Free Exercise
and Conscientious Objection to Draft Registration, 25 VAL. U. L. RExv. 455, 503 n.131 (1991)
("A strong argument could also be made that the right to not kill implicates a funda-
mental right of conscience that goes beyond free exercise of religion, thus becoming
a 'hybrid' case .....
166 See generally Peter M. Stein, Smith v. Fair Employment and Housing Commis-
sion: Does the Right to Exclude, Combined with Religious Freedom, Present a "Hybrid Situa-
tion" Under Employment Division v. Smith, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 141 (1995). See also
Berg, supra note 13, at 751 (rights of private property).
167 Smolin, supra note 19, at 30.
168 Laura B. Brown, Note, He Who Controls the Mind Controls the Body: False Imprison-
ment, Religious Cults, and the Destruction of Volitional Capacity, 25 VAL. U. L. REv. 407, 454
n.211 (1991) ("[T]he use of brainwashing as a recruiting method arguably does in-
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tions are indeed open, how "significant" does a constitutional right
have to be to receive protection? Must it qualify as a "fundamental"
right?169
The judicial arena does not provide a conclusive answer to this
question. The few courts which have addressed the issue have been
far more inclined to limit the hybrid exception as much as possible.'70
Most have followed the reasoning of Waguespack v. Rodriguez.171
There, the court noted that "the suggestion of such a hybrid excep-
tion on the facts of this case would be strained, inventive, and without
any constitutionally limiting principle. It would be difficult to imagine
any free exercise claim that would not fit into the 'hybrid' classifica-
tion.1 72 For example, the Ninth Circuit refused to accept an equal
protection hybrid since "[i] t is questionable whether an equal protec-
tion claim can satisfy the hybrid claim requirements of Smith."'7 3 In
State v. Hershberger, Amish defendants raised a hybrid based upon
(among other things) the freedoms of assembly and travel, but the
court chose to analyze the case solely under the Minnesota Constitu-
tion.174 Thiry v. Carlson involved a hybrid based on "substantive due
process rights to family unity and integrity," but the court dismissed it
for lack of a factual basis. 175 Finally, in Steckler v. United States, the
plaintiff attempted to create a hybrid based upon the Fifth Amend-
ment right to compensation for property taken by the government.176
The court summarily dismissed the claim.
A final possible hybrid that has been raised is the combination of
free exercise with a state constitutional protection. Taking the lan-
volve a hybrid situation because such proselytizing implicates First Amendment free
speech rights as well as free exercise rights.").
169 See generally Fry, supra note 19, at 856-57. Fry noted that hybrid analysis does
not add anything to fundamental rights since these are already subject to strict scru-
tiny. Thus, it only has a noticable effect upon possible hybrid combinations which do
not already require strict scrutiny.
170 The First Circuit at least appears to recognize the possibility of bringing such
claims. In analyzing a proffered hybrid claim, the court rejected it because it did "not
state a privacy or substantive due process claim" which would be "an independently
protected constitutional protection." Brown v. Hot, Sexy, and Safer Prods., Inc., 68
F.3d 525, 539 (1st Cir. 1995).
171 220 B.R. 31 (1998).
172 Id. at 35-36.
173 United States v. Carlson, No. 90-10465, 1992 WL 64772, at *2 (9th Cir. Apr. 2,
1992). Unfortunately, the court did not specify what these "requirements" were.
174 State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 396 (Minn. 1990).
175 Thiryv. Carlson, 78 F.3d 1491, 1496 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 78
(1996).
176 Stedder v. United States, No. Civ. A. 96-1054, 1998 WL 28235 (E.D. La.Jan. 26,
1998).
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guage of Smith at literal face value ("other constitutional protec-
tions"), this would seem to be possible. A California Court of Appeals
noted this possibility in Donahue v. Fair Employment and Housing Com-
mission.177 No court has accepted such a possibility, however, and
such mixing and matching of constitutions has little chance of
SUCCeSS. 178
A telling example of this reluctance to create new hybrids is seen
in American Friends Service Committee v. Thornburgh.179 The AFSC (a
charitable Quaker relief organization) was in the practice of hiring
foreign aliens who were not licensed to work in the United States.
Under the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA), this practice
was made illegal. Rather than change its hiring practices, the AFSC
challenged the constitutionality of the IRCA.' 80
AFSC contends that its claim is "hybrid" in that it combines a sub-
stantive due process "right to employ" with a free exercise claim. At
least since the demise of Lochner v. New York, the "right to employ"
has been accorded insufficient constitutional protection to place it
alongside the cases Smith cites as examples of "hybrid claims."...
There would be little left of the Smith decision if an additional inter-
est of such slight constitutional weight as "the right to hire" were
sufficient to qualify for this exception.' 8 '
The only case in which a new hybrid was accepted was in the
highly unlikely setting of EEOC v. Catholic University.182 Sister Eliza-
beth McDonough, a canon law teacher, brought a Title VII action al-
leging that the university discriminated against her on the basis of sex.
The D.C. Circuit held that the ministerial exception of the Free Exer-
cise Clause and excessive entanglement concerns precluded applica-
177 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32, 40 n.10 (Ct. App. 1991) ("Here, arguably, a hybrid state
constitutional claim exists .... ").
178 The plaintiffs in Jane L. v. Bangerter attempted to create a hybrid between free
exercise and the right to practice a profession. The court held that "plaintiffs' argu-
ment based upon the right to practice a profession fails. The right to practice the
professions in question is created by the State ... ." Jane L. v. Bangerter, 794 F. Supp.
1537, 1547 (D. Utah 1992). This reluctance to combine federal with state rights for
hybrid analysis is the more likely course that courts will follow.
179 961 F.2d 1405 (9th Cir. 1991).
180 For a case raising a very similar claim,'see Intercommunity Center for Justice and
Peace v. INS, 910 F.2d 42 (2d Cir. 1990) (involving a Catholic organization challenge
to the IRCA). It is unclear whether a hybrid claim was raised by the plaintiff but the
court sealed this avenue anyway by holding that "this case does not involve a hybrid
claim in which other constitutional concerns bolster the free exercise claim." Id. at
44.
181 Thornburgh, 961 F.2d at 1408 (citation omitted).
182 83 F.3d 455 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
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tion of Title VII to McDonough's claim. Thus, for all intents and
purposes, the case was decided.' 8 3 Yet, as in so many other hybrid
cases, the court decided to give itself one final backup.
We have demonstrated that the EEOC's attempt to enforce Title VII
would both burden Catholic University's right of free exercise and
excessively entangle the Government in religion. As a consequence,
this case presents the kind of "hybrid situation" referred to in Smith
that permits us to find a violation of the Free Exercise Clause even if
our earlier conclusion that the ministerial exception survived Smith
should prove mistaken.' 8 4
This bizarre twist can only be noted as the exception to the un-
written judicial rule against "new" hybrids. Otherwise, academics will
continue to create hybrid "wannabes" and the courts will continue to
limit them. In fact, the hybrid claim has been judicially limited "pre-
cisely because it had the potential to swallow the rule."'8 5 But even if
hybrid claims are extended to include rights not specifically men-
tioned in Smith, they would still remain subject to the same limiting
subterfuge interpretation.
VI. CONCLUSION
Analysis of hybrid claims in the lower courts leads to the unmis-
takable conclusion that the hybrid "calculus" or logical interpretation
(i.e., two loser constitutional claims = one winner constitutional
claim) simply is not being applied. Instead, these cases are being de-
cided based solely upon the strength or weakness of the "other" con-
stitutional provision without reference to the Free Exercise Clause.' 8 6
This explains two general principles which apply to virtually every hy-
brid case. First, when a court allows a hybrid to "win" by applying
strict scrutiny to the claim, it never does so as the primary basis for the
183 See id. at 467 ("These conclusions are a sufficient basis for affirming the district
court's dismissal of this case under the Establishment Clause."); see also id. at 465
(affirming the dismissal on the basis of the Free Exercise Clause).
184 Id. at 467.
185 Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious Freedom Restora-
tion Act, 73 TEx. L. REv. 209, 214 (1994).
186 See Richard M. Paul III & Derek Rose, Comment, The Clash Between the First
Amendment and Civil Rights: Public University Nondiscrimination Clauses, 60 Mo. L. REv.
889, 919 (1995) ("While a 'hybrid' case allows the courts to apply the compelling
interest test to free exercise claims, the majority of the laws challenged in such cases
would be struck down anyway due to the strict scrutiny applied to the other constitu-
tional right infringed upon.") (footnote omitted).
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decision.' 8 7 Either the case had already been decided on some other
basis (such as free speech), or strict scrutiny was mandated by the state
constitution anyway. Second, the "success" of hybrid claims is directly
tied to the constitutional strength of the right with which free exercise
is combined. Thus, free speech hybrids are more likely to win than
parental right to educate hybrids. So, Justice Souter was right:
"[T] here [was] no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid
cases to have mentioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.' 88
Despite its troublesome background, the Smith hybrid exception
is a part of current free exercise law that must be understood and
taken into consideration. 8 9 Whether or not the Court's analysis is
"reasonable" is irrelevant to answering the question of how free exer-
cise will currently be analyzed. As Professor Joanne Brant has noted:
"Scalia's use of 'hybrid rights' as an unartful tool to distinguish troub-
ling precedent simply does not weaken the force of the Court's institu-
tional argument. The fact that the Court draws its boundaries
illogically does not mean that its power to establish those boundaries
is suspect...."19 0 However illogical, the hybrid exception is a bound-
ary which must be applied.191
What is important is that these current boundaries are properly
understood for what they are. The hybrid claim is no more than a
smoke screen under which the Court hides the wreck of the rapidly
sinking Free Exercise Clause. And the only passengers to survive are
those picked up by the lifeboats of other constitutional provisions.
William L. Esser IV*
187 Thus, the Sixth Circuit's formal rejection of hybrid analysis in Kissinger
presents no problem to the religious claimant. Since protections remain available
under free speech, et cetera, it is still possible to receive all the protection offered by a
hybrid without its awkward framework.
188 Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567 (1993).
189 Professor Berg goes so far as to recommend that "Congress enshrine the [hy-
brid] category in a statute" as a way of "calling the Court's bluff." Berg, supra note 13,
at 751.
190 Brant, supra note 13, at 30.
191 Professor Lupu encourages "pressing hybrid claims wherever plausible [since
this] will presumably result in either an explanation and reaffirmation of 'free exer-
cise plus' or an ultimate admission by the Court that the theory was no more than an
unprincipled attempt to pretend that Yoder survived Smith." Lupu, supra note 43, at
267.
* Ad Majorem Dei Gloriam. Candidate forJuris Doctor, Notre Dame Law School,
1999; BA. Belmont Abbey College, 1995. Special thanks to my family who gave me
the gift of life, and to Professors John Garvey, Charles Rice, and Patrick Schiltz for
their guidance and inspiration.
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